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Abstract
The computation of bilinear pairings has been considered the most expensive operation in pairing-based cryptographic protocols. In this paper, we first propose an
efficient and secure outsourcing algorithm for bilinear pairings in the two untrusted
program model. Compared with the state-of-the-art algorithm, a distinguishing
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property of our proposed algorithm is that the (resource-constrained) outsourcer
is not required to perform any expensive operations, such as point multiplications
or exponentiations. Furthermore, we utilize this algorithm as a subroutine to achieve
outsource-secure identity-based encryptions and signatures.
Key words: Cloud computing, Outsource-secure algorithms, Bilinear pairings,
Untrusted program model.
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1

Introduction

2

With the rapid development in availability of cloud services, the techniques

3

for securely outsourcing the prohibitively expensive computations to untrusted

4

servers are getting more and more attentions in the scientific community. In the

5

outsourcing computation paradigm, the resource-constrained devices can enjoy

6

the unlimited computation resources in a pay-per-use manner, which avoids

7

large capital outlays in hardware/software deployment and maintenance.

8

Despite the tremendous benefits, outsourcing computation also inevitably in-

9

troduces some new security concerns and challenges. Firstly, the computation

10

tasks often contain some sensitive information that should not be exposed to

11

the untrusted cloud servers. Therefore, the first security challenge is the secrecy

12

of the outsourcing computation: the cloud servers should not learn anything

13

about the data (including the secret inputs and the outputs). We argue that

14

the encryption can only provide a partial solution to this problem since it is

15

very difficult to perform meaningful computations over the encrypted data.

16

Note that fully homomorphic encryption could be a potential solution, but the
∗ The corresponding author: Xiaofeng Chen (xfchen@xidian.edu.cn)
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17

existing schemes are impractical. Secondly, the semi-trusted cloud servers may

18

return an invalid result. For example, the servers might contain a software bug

19

that will fail on a constant number of invocations. Moreover, the servers might

20

decrease the amount of the computation due to financial incentives and then

21

return a computationally indistinguishable (invalid) result. Therefore, the sec-

22

ond security challenge is the checkability of the outsourcing computation: the

23

outsourcer should have the ability to detect any failures if the cloud servers

24

misbehave. Trivially, the test procedure should never need to perform other

25

complicated computations since the computationally limited devices such as

26

RFID tags or smartcard may be incapable to accomplish the test. At the very

27

least, it must be far more efficient than accomplishing the computation task

28

itself (recall the motivation for outsourcing computations).

29

In the last decade, the bilinear pairings, especially the Weil pairing and Tate

30

pairing of algebraic curves, have initiated some completely new fields in cryp-

31

tography, making it possible to realize cryptographic primitives that were pre-

32

viously unknown or impractical [11,15,34]. Trivially, implementing the pairing-

33

based cryptographic protocols is dependent on the fast computation of pair-

34

ings, and thus plenty of research work has been done to implement this work-

35

load efficiently [10,13,15,33,36,42].

36

The computation of bilinear pairings has been considered the prohibitive ex-

37

pensive operation in embedded devices such as the RFID tag or smardcard

38

(note that we even assume that the modular exponentiation is too expensive

39

to be carried out on such devices). Chevallier-Mames et al. [20] presented the

40

first algorithm for secure delegation of elliptic-curve pairings based on an un-

41

trusted server model. Besides, the outsourcer could detect any failures with

42

probability 1 if the server misbehaves. However, an obvious disadvantage of
3

43

the algorithm is that the outsourcer should carry out some other expensive op-

44

erations such as point multiplications and exponentiations. More precisely, on

45

the one hand, we argue that these expensive operations might be too resource

46

consuming to be carried out on a computationally limited device. On the other

47

hand, the computation of point multiplications is even comparable to that of

48

bilinear pairings in some scenarios [25,42] 1 . Therefore, it is meaningless if the

49

client must perform point multiplications in order to outsource pairings since

50

this contradicts with the aim of outsourcing computation. Therefore, the al-

51

gorithm is meaningless for real-world applications in this sense. To the best

52

of our knowledge, it seems that all of the following works on delegation of

53

bilinear pairings [17,35,44] also suffer from the same problems.

54

Our Contribution. In this paper, we propose the first efficient and se-

55

cure outsourcing algorithm of bilinear pairings in the one-malicious version

56

of two untrusted program model [32]. Compared with the state-of-the-art al-

57

gorithm in [20], a distinguishing property of our proposed algorithm is that

58

the (resource-constrained) outsourcer never needs to perform any expensive

59

operations such as point multiplications and exponentiations. Hence, our pro-

60

posed algorithm is very practical. Furthermore, we also utilize this algorithm

61

as a subroutine to achieve outsource-secure Boneh-Franklin identity-based en-

62

cryptions and Cha-Cheon identity-based signatures.

1

As pointed out in [25,42], when the supersingular elliptic curve is defined over a

512-bit finite field with embedding degree 2, the computational overhead of a point
multiplication is almost the same as that of a standard Tate pairing.
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63

1.1

Related Work

64

Abadi et al. [2] proved the impossibility of secure outsourcing an exponential

65

computation while locally doing only polynomial time work. Therefore, it is

66

meaningful only to consider outsourcing expensive polynomial time computa-

67

tions. The theoretical computer science community has devoted considerable

68

attention to the problem of how to securely outsource different kinds of expen-

69

sive computations. Atallah et al. [3] presented a framework for secure outsourc-

70

ing of scientific computations such as matrix multiplications and quadrature.

71

However, the solution used the disguise technique and thus allowed leakage of

72

private information. Atallah and Li [4] investigated the problem of computing

73

the edit distance between two sequences and presented an efficient protocol

74

to securely outsource sequence comparisons to two servers. Recently, Blan-

75

ton et al. proposed a more efficient scheme for secure outsourcing sequence

76

comparisons [9]. Blanton and Aliasgari [6,7] proposed an efficient scheme for

77

secure outsourcing DNA computations and biometric comparisons. Benjamin

78

and Atallah [5] addressed the problem of secure outsourcing for widely appli-

79

cable linear algebra computations. However, the proposed protocols required

80

the expensive operations of homomorphic encryptions. Atallah and Frikken

81

[1] further studied this problem and gave improved protocols based on the

82

so-called weak secret hiding assumption. Recently, Wang et al. [45] presented

83

efficient mechanisms for secure outsourcing of linear programming computa-

84

tions.

85

The problem of securely outsourcing expensive computations has been well

86

studied in the cryptography community. In 1992, Chaum and Pedersen [21]

87

firstly introduced the notion of wallets with observers, a piece of secure hard5

88

ware installed on the client’s computer to perform some expensive computa-

89

tions. Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [32] proposed the first outsource-secure

90

algorithm for modular exponentiations based on the two previous approaches

91

of precomputation [16,41] and server-aided computation [29,39]. Very recently,

92

Chen et al. [19] proposed more efficient outsource-secure algorithms for (si-

93

multaneously) modular exponentiation in the two untrusted program model.

94

Since the servers (or workers) are not trusted by the outsourcers, Golle and

95

Mironov [31] first introduced the concept of ringers to solve the trust prob-

96

lem of verifying computation completion. The following works focused on the

97

other trust problem of retrieving payments [8,23,24,43]. Besides, Gennaro et

98

al. [27] first formalized the notion of verifiable computation to solve the prob-

99

lem of verifiably outsourcing the computation of an arbitrary functions, which

100

has attracted the attention of plenty of researchers [14,28,30,37,38]. Gennaro

101

et al. [27] also proposed a protocol that allowed the outsourcer to efficiently

102

verify the outputs of the computations with a computationally sound, non-

103

interactive proof (instead of interactive ones). Benabbas et al. [12] presented

104

the first practical verifiable computation scheme for high degree polynomial

105

functions. In 2011, Green et al. [26] proposed new methods for efficiently

106

and securely outsourcing decryption of attribute-based encryption (ABE) ci-

107

phertexts. Based on this work, Parno et al. [40] showed a construction of a

108

multi-function verifiable computation scheme.

109

1.2

110

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some background and prelim-

111

inaries that will be required throughout this paper are presented in Section

Organization

6

112

2. The security definitions for outsourcing computation are provided in Sec-

113

tion 3. The proposed new outsource-secure bilinear pairings algorithm and its

114

security analysis are presented in Section 4. The proposed outsource-secure

115

identity-based encryptions and signatures are given in Section 5. Finally, Sec-

116

tion 6 concludes the paper.

117

2

118

In this section, we will briefly describe the basic definition and properties of

119

bilinear pairings [11,15,18,25] and then overview the algorithm for delegation

120

of pairings [20].

121

2.1

122

Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic additive groups generated by P1 and P2 , respec-

123

tively. The order of G1 and G2 is a large prime order q. Define GT to be a

124

cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a map

125

e : G1 × G2 → GT with the following properties:

Preliminaries

Bilinear Pairings

126

(1) Bilinear: e(aR, bQ) = e(R, Q)ab for all R ∈ G1 , Q ∈ G2 , and a, b ∈ Z∗q .

127

(2) Non-degenerate: There exists R ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2 such that e(R, Q) 6= 1.

128

(3) Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(R, Q) for all

129

R, Q ∈ G1 .

130

The examples of such groups can be found in supersingular elliptic curves or

131

hyperelliptic curves over finite fields, and the bilinear pairings can be derived

132

from the Weil or Tate pairings. For more details, see [11,15,18,25].
7

133

For the ease of simplicity, we use the above notations throughout this paper.

134

2.2

135

The input of Chevallier-Mames et al.’s algorithm [20] is two random points

136

A ∈ G1 , B ∈ G2 , and the output is e(A, B). Assume that the outsourcer T

137

has been given the value of e(P1 , P2 ).

Algorithm for Delegation of Elliptic-Curve Pairings

(1) The outsourcer T generates two random elements g1 , g2 ∈ Zq , and queries
the following pairings to the server U :
α1 = e(A + g1 P1 , P2 ), α2 = e(P1 , B + g2 P2 ), α3 = e(A + g1 P1 , B + g2 P2 ).
138

139

(2) The outsourcer T verifies that αi ∈ GT , by checking αiq = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3.
Otherwise, T outputs ⊥ and halts.

140

(3) The outsourcer T computes e(A, B) = α1−g2 α2−g1 α3 e(P1 , P2 )g1 g2 .

141

(4) The outsourcer T generates four random elements a1 , r1 , a2 , r2 ∈ Zq , and

142

queries the following pairing to the server U :

α4 = e(a1 A + r1 P1 , a2 B + r2 P2 ).
143

(5) The outsourcer T computes

α40 = e(A, B)a1 a2 α1a1 r2 α2a2 r1 e(P1 , P2 )r1 r2 −a1 g1 r2 −a2 g2 r1 .
144

T outputs e(A, B) if and only if α40 = α4 .

145

Remark 1. We argue that the outsourcer T should perform some expensive

146

operations such as point multiplications and exponentiations. In some cases,

147

this contradicts with the motivation of the outsourcing computations.
8

148

3

Formal Security Definitions

149

In this section, we introduce some definitions for secure outsourcing of a cryp-

150

tographic algorithm [32].

151

Informally, we say that an honest but resources-constrained component T

152

securely outsources some expensive work to an untrusted component U , and

153

(T, U ) is an outsource-secure implementation of a cryptographic algorithm Alg

154

if (1) T and U implement Alg, i.e., Alg = T U and (2) suppose that T is given

155

oracle access to a malicious U 0 (instead of U ) that records all of its computation

156

over time and tries to act maliciously, U 0 cannot learn anything interesting

157

about the input and output of T U . Besides, another part of the adversary

158

A is the adversarial environment E that submits adversatively chosen inputs

159

to Alg, i.e., A = (E, U 0 ). One fundamental assumption is that E and U 0 will

160

not have a direct communication channel after they begin interacting with

161

T (although E and U 0 may develop a joint strategy beforehand). That is, E

162

and U 0 can only communicate with each other by passing messages through

163

T . In the real world, a malicious manufacturer E might program its software

164

U 0 to behave in an adversarial fashion. However, once U 0 has been installed

165

behind the firewall of T , E is no longer able to send instructions to U 0 . This

166

implies that E may know something about the protected inputs to Alg that

167

U 0 does not. For example, E can see all of its own adversarial inputs to Alg,

168

while T might hide some of these from U 0 . Otherwise, if U 0 could see any

169

values chosen by E, then E and U 0 still can agree on a joint strategy that

170

causes U 0 to terminate its tasks upon receiving some predefined message from

171

E. As a result, no security guarantee can be provided. We illustrate this with

172

the proposed outsourcing algorithm [19], if E could capture all of network

0

9

173

traffic of T , then E can know which are the test queries (note that T must

174

invoke the subroutine Rand and store all the results in its hard disk). As a

175

result, U 0 can also know the facts by communicating with E. Consequently,

176

when T sends the queries to U 0 , U 0 only honestly computes the results for

177

the test queries. For the remaining queries, U 0 terminates and just returns a

178

random value. Therefore, U 0 can always cheat T without being detected and

179

no security guarantees can be obtained.

180

The inputs to Alg can be categorized into three logical divisions: (1) Secret:

181

information is only available to T (e.g., a secret key or a plaintext) and re-

182

mains hidden from E and U 0 ; (2) Protected: information is only available to

183

T and E (e.g., a public key or a ciphertext) while remains hidden from U 0 ; (3)

184

Unprotected: information is available to T , E and U 0 (e.g, the time-stamp).

185

similarly, Alg has secret, protected, and unprotected outputs. Moreover, the

186

divisions for inputs can be further categorized based on whether the inputs

187

are generated honestly or adversarially except the case of adversarial, secret

188

inputs (note that E cannot generate secret inputs which are only available to

189

T ). Therefore, Alg will take five types of inputs and produce three types of

190

outputs.

191

The formal definition of an algorithm with outsource-input/output is given as

192

follows:

193

Definition 1 (Algorithm with outsource-I/O) An algorithm Alg obeys

194

the outsource input/output specification if it takes five inputs, and produces

195

three outputs. The first three inputs are generated by an honest party, and are

196

classified by how much the adversary A = (E, U 0 ) knows about them, where

197

E is the adversarial environment that submits adversarially chosen inputs to
10

198

Alg, and U 0 is the adversarial software operating in place of oracle U . The first

199

input is called the honest, secret input, which is unknown to both E and U 0 ; the

200

second is called the honest, protected input, which may be known by E, but is

201

protected from U 0 ; and the third is called the honest, unprotected input, which

202

may be known by both E and U . In addition, there are two adversarially-chosen

203

inputs generated by the environment E: the adversarial, protected input, which

204

is known to E, but protected from U 0 ; and the adversarial, unprotected input,

205

which may be known by E and U 2 . Similarly, the first output called secret is

206

unknown to both E and U 0 ; the second is protected, which may be known to E,

207

but not U 0 ; and the third is unprotected, which may be known by both parties

208

of A.

209

The following definition of outsource-security means that if a malicious U 0

210

can learn something secret or protected about the inputs to T U from being

211

T ’s oracle instead of U , it can also learn without that. That is, there exists a

212

simulator S that, when told that T U (x) was invoked, simulates the view of U 0

213

without access to the secret or protected inputs of x. Similarly, the definition

214

also ensures that the malicious environment E cannot gain any knowledge of

215

the secret inputs and outputs of T U , even if T uses the malicious software U 0

216

written by E. Also, there exists a simulator S 0 that, when told that T U (x) was

217

invoked, can simulate the view of E without access to the secret inputs of x.

218

Definition 2 (Outsource-security) Let Alg be an algorithm with outsource

219

I/O. A pair of algorithms (T, U ) is said to be an outsource-secure implemen2

For any outsource-secure implementation in the real applications, the adversarial,

unprotected input must be empty. Even if it contains a single bit, then a covert
channel may be created from E and U 0 . Then, a k bits of shared information can
be obtained after interacting k rounds.
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220

tation of Alg if:

221

(1) Correctness: T U is a correct implementation of Alg.

222

(2) Security: For all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A = (E, U 0 ),

223

there exist probabilistic expected polynomial-time simulators (S1 , S2 ) such

224

that the following pairs of random variables are computationally indistin-

225

guishable.

226

227

228

• Pair One. EVIEWreal ∼ EVIEWideal :
· The view that the the adversarial environment E obtains by participating in the following real process:

229

EVIEWireal = {(istatei , xihs , xihp , xihu ) ← I(1k , istatei−1 );

230

i
i
(estatei , j i , xiap , xiau , stopi ) ← E(1k , EVIEWi−1
real , xhp , xhu );

231

(tstatei , ustatei , ysi , ypi , yui ) ←
0

T U (ustate

232

i−1 )

i

i

i

(tstatei−1 , xjhs , xjhp , xjhu , xiap , xiau ) :
(estatei , ypi , yui )}

233

234

EVIEWreal = EVIEWireal if stopi = TRUE.

235

The real process proceeds in rounds. In round i, the honest (secret,

236

protected, and unprotected) inputs (xihs , xihp , xihu ) are picked using an

237

honest, stateful process I to which the environment E does not have

238

access. Then E, based on its view from the last round, chooses (0)

239

the value of its estatei variable as a way of remembering what it did

240

next time it is invoked; (1) which previously generated honest inputs

241

(xihs , xihp , xihu ) to give to T U (note that E can specify the index j i of

242

these inputs, but not their values); (2) the adversarial, protected input

243

xiap ; (3) the adversarial, unprotected input xiau ; (4) the Boolean variable

244

stopi that determines whether round i is the last round in this process.

245

Next, the algorithm T U is run on the inputs (tstatei−1 , xjhs , xjhp , xjhu , xiap , xiau ),

0

i

0
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i

i

246

where tstatei−1 is T ’s previously saved state, and produces a new state

247

tstatei for T , as well as the secret ysi , protected ypi and unprotected yui

248

outputs. The oracle U 0 is given its previously saved state, ustatei−1 , as

249

input, and the current state of U 0 is saved in the variable ustatei . The

250

view of the real process in round i consists of estatei , and the values ypi

251

and yui . The overall view of E in the real process is just its view in the

252

last round (i.e., i for which stopi = TRUE.).

253

· The ideal process:

254

EVIEWiideal = {(istatei , xihs , xihp , xihu ) ← I(1k , istatei−1 );

255

i−1
, xihp , xihu );
(estatei , j i , xiap , xiau , stopi ) ← E(1k , EVIEWideal

256

(astatei , ysi , ypi , yui ) ← Alg(astatei−1 , xjhs , xjhp , xjhu , xiap , xiau );

i

i

i

U 0 (ustatei−1 )

257

(sstatei , ustatei , Ypi , Yui , repi ) ← S1
i

i

258

(sstatei−1 , · · · , xjhp , xjhu , xiap , xiau , ypi , yui );

259

(zpi , zui ) = repi (Ypi , Yui ) + (1 − repi )(ypi , yui ) :

260

(estatei , zpi , zui )}

261

EVIEWideal = EVIEWiideal if stopi = TRUE.

262

The ideal process also proceeds in rounds. In the ideal process, we

263

have a stateful simulator S1 who, shielded from the secret input xihs , but

264

given the non-secret outputs that Alg produces when run all the inputs

265

for round i, decides to either output the values (ypi , yui ) generated by

266

Alg, or replace them with some other values (Ypi , Yui ). Note that this is

267

captured by having the indicator variable repi be a bit that determines

268

whether ypi will be replaced with Ypi . In doing so, it is allowed to query

269

oracle U 0 ; moreover, U 0 saves its state as in the real experiment.

270

271

• Pair Two. UVIEWreal ∼ UVIEWideal :
· The view that the untrusted software U 0 obtains by participating in

13

272

the real process described in Pair One. UVIEWreal = (ustatei , yui )

273

if stopi = TRUE.

274

· The ideal process:

275

UVIEWiideal = {(istatei , xihs , xihp , xihu ) ← I(1k , istatei−1 );

276

(estatei , j i , xiap , xiau , stopi ) ← E(1k , estatei−1 , xihp , xihu , ypi−1 , yui−1 );

277

(astatei , ysi , ypi , yui ) ← Alg(astatei−1 , xjhs , xjhp , xjhu , xiap , xiau );

i

U 0 (ustatei−1 )

278

(sstatei , ustatei ) ← S2

i

i

(sstatei−1 , xjhu , xiau , yui ) :
(ustatei , yui )}

279

280

i

UVIEWideal = UVIEWiideal if stopi = TRUE.

281

In the ideal process, we have a stateful simulator S2 who, equipped

282

with only the unprotected inputs/outputs (xihu , xiau , yui ), queries U 0 . As

283

before, U 0 may maintain state.

284

Given an outsource-secure implementation of a cryptographic algorithm Alg =

285

T U , we should compare the overhead of T with that for the fastest known

286

implementation of Alg. Besides, if the algorithm Alg could not provide 100

287

percent checkability, we should evaluate the probability that T could detect

288

the misbehavior of U .

289

Definition 3 (α-efficient, secure outsourcing) A pair of algorithms (T, U )

290

is said to be an α-efficient implementation of Alg if (1) T U is a correct imple-

291

mentation of Alg and (2) ∀ inputs x, the running time of T is no more than

292

an α-multiplicative factor of the running time of Alg.

293

Definition 4 (β-checkable, secure outsourcing) A pair of algorithms

294

(T, U ) is said to be an β-checkable implementation of Alg if (1) T U is a correct

295

implementation of Alg and (2) ∀ inputs x, if U 0 deviates from its advertised

296

functionality during the execution of T U (x), T will detect the error with prob-

0
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297

ability no less than β.

298

Definition 5 ((α, β)-outsource-security) A pair of algorithms (T, U ) is

299

said to be an (α, β)-outsource-secure implementation of Alg if it is both α-

300

efficient and β-checkable.

301

4

302

4.1

303

Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [32] first presented the so-called two untrusted

304

program model for outsourcing cryptographic computations. In the two un-

305

trusted program model, the adversarial environment E writes the code for

306

two (potentially different) programs U 0 = (U10 , U20 ). E then gives this software

307

to T , advertising a functionality that U10 and U20 may or may not accurately

308

compute, and T installs this software in a manner such that all subsequent

309

communication between any two of E, U10 and U20 must pass through T . The

310

new adversary attacking T is A = (E, U10 , U20 ). Moreover, we assume that at

311

most one of the programs U10 and U20 deviates from its advertised functionality

312

on a non-negligible fraction of the inputs, while we cannot know which one

313

and security means that there is a simulator S for both. This is named as the

314

one-malicious version of two untrusted program model (i.e., “one-malicious

315

model” for the simplicity) 3 . In the real-world applications, it is equivalent to
3

New Outsource-Secure Algorithm of Bilinear Pairings

Security Model

Canetti, Riva, and Rothblum [22] introduced the refereed delegation of computa-

tion model, where the outsourcer delegates the computation to several servers under
the assumption that at least one of the servers is honest. Trivially, one-malicious
model can be viewed as a special case of refereed delegation of computation model.
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316

buy the two copies of the advertised software from two different vendors and

317

achieve the security as long as one of them is honest.

318

Similar to [32], we also use a subroutine named Rand in order to speed up the

319

computations. The inputs for Rand are the groups G1 and G2 with prime

320

order q, the bilinear pairing e, and possibly some other (random) values,

321

and the outputs for each invocation are a random, independent six-tuple

322

(V1 , V2 , v1 V1 , v2 V1 , v2 V2 , e(v1 V1 , v2 V2 )), where v1 , v2 ∈R Z∗q , V1 ∈R G1 , and

323

V2 ∈R G2 . A naive approach to implement this functionality is for a trusted

324

server to compute a table of random, independent six-tuple in advance and

325

then load it into the memory of T . For each invocation of Rand, T just retrieves

326

a new six-tuple in the table (the table-lookup method).

327

4.2

328

In this section, we propose a new secure outsourcing algorithm Pair for bi-

329

linear pairings in the one-malicious model. In Pair, T outsources its pairing

330

computations to U1 and U2 by invoking the subroutine Rand. A requirement

331

for Pair is that the adversary A cannot know any useful information about

332

the inputs and outputs of Pair.

333

The input of Pair is two random points A ∈ G1 , B ∈ G2 , and the output

334

of Pair is e(A, B). Note that A and B may be secret or (honest/adversarial)

335

protected and e(A, B) is always secret or protected. Moreover, both A and

336

B are computationally blinded to U1 and U2 . We let Ui (Λ1 , Λ2 ) → e(Λ1 , Λ2 )

337

denote that Ui takes as inputs (Λ1 , Λ2 ) and outputs e(Λ1 , Λ2 ), where i = 1, 2.

338

The proposed outsourcing algorithm Pair consists of the following steps:

Outsourcing Algorithm
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339

(1) To implement this functionality using U1 and U2 , T firstly runs Rand

340

to create a blinding six-tuple (V1 , V2 , v1 V1 , v2 V1 , v2 V2 , e(v1 V1 , v2 V2 )). We

341

denote λ = e(v1 V1 , v2 V2 ).

342

(2) The main trick of Pair is to logically split A and B into random looking

343

pieces that can be computed by U1 and U2 . Without loss of generality, let

344

α1 = e(A+v1 V1 , B +v2 V2 ), α2 = e(A+V1 , v2 V2 ), and α3 = e(v1 V1 , B +V2 ).

345

Note that

α1 = e(A, B)e(A, v2 V2 )e(v1 V1 , B)e(v1 V1 , v2 V2 ),
α2 = e(A, v2 V2 )e(V1 , v2 V2 ),
α3 = e(v1 V1 , B)e(v1 V1 , V2 ),
346

Therefore, e(A, B) = α1 α2−1 α3−1 λ−1 e(V1 , V2 )v1 +v2 .
(3) T then runs Rand to obtain two new six-tuple
(X1 , X2 , x1 X1 , x2 X1 , x2 X2 , e(x1 X1 , x2 X2 ))
and
(Y1 , Y2 , y1 Y1 , y2 Y1 , y2 Y2 , e(y1 Y1 , y2 Y2 )).

347

(4) T queries U1 in random order as

348

U1 (A + v1 V1 , B + v2 V2 ) → e(A + v1 V1 , B + v2 V2 ) = α1 ;

349

U1 (v1 V1 + v2 V1 , V2 ) → e(V1 , V2 )v1 +v2 ;

350

U1 (x1 X1 , x2 X2 ) → e(x1 X1 , x2 X2 );

351

U1 (y1 Y1 , y2 Y2 ) → e(y1 Y1 , y2 Y2 );

352

Similarly, T queries U2 in random order as

353

U2 (A + V1 , v2 V2 ) → e(A + V1 , v2 V2 ) = α2 ;

354

U2 (v1 V1 , B + V2 ) → e(v1 V1 , B + V2 ) = α3 ;

355

U2 (x1 X1 , x2 X2 ) → e(x1 X1 , x2 X2 );
17

U2 (y1 Y1 , y2 Y2 ) → e(y1 Y1 , y2 Y2 );

356

357

(5) Finally, T checks that both U1 and U2 produce the correct outputs, i.e.,

358

e(x1 X1 , x2 X2 ) and e(y1 Y1 , y2 Y2 ) for the test queries. If not, T outputs

359

“error”; otherwise, T can compute e(A, B) = α1 α2−1 α3−1 λ−1 e(V1 , V2 )v1 +v2 .
Remark 2. Given a random point P in G1 (or G2 ), T can compute the
inverse point −P easily. Therefore, T can query U2 (A + V1 , −v2 V2 ) → e(A +
V1 , −v2 V2 ) = α2−1 and U2 (−v1 V1 , B +V2 ) → e(−v1 V1 , B +V2 ) = α3−1 . Similarly,
we can define the outputs of Rand be
(V1 , V2 , v1 V1 , v2 V1 , v2 V2 , e(v1 V1 , v2 V2 )−1 ).

360

Therefore, T needs not to perform the inverse computation in GT .

361

4.3

362

Theorem 1 In the one-malicious model, the algorithms (T, (U1 , U2 )) are an

363

outsource-secure implementation of Pair, where the input (A, B) may be hon-

364

est, secret; or honest, protected; or adversarial, protected.

365

Proof. The proof is similar to [32]. The correctness is trivial and we only

366

focus on security. Let A = (E, U10 , U20 ) be a PPT adversary that interacts with

367

a PPT algorithm T in the one-malicious model.

368

Firstly, we prove Pair One EVIEWreal ∼ EVIEWideal :

369

Note that we only consider three types of input (A, B): honest, secret; or

370

honest, protected; or adversarial, protected. If the input (A, B) is anything

371

other than honest, secret (this means that the input (A, B) is either honest,

372

protected or adversarial, protected. Obviously, neither types of input (A, B)

Security Analysis
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373

is secret), then the simulation is trivial. That is, the simulator S1 behaves the

374

same way as in the real execution. Trivially, S1 never requires to access the

375

secret input since neither types of input (A, B) is secret.

376

If (A, B) is an honest, secret input, then the simulator S1 behaves as follows:

377

On receiving the input on round i, S1 ignores it and instead makes four ran-

378

dom queries of the form (Pj , Qj ) to both U10 and U20 . S1 randomly tests two

379

outputs (i.e., e(Pj , Qj )) from each program. If an error is detected, S1 saves

380

all states and outputs Ypi =“error”, Yui =∅, repi =1 (i.e., the output for ideal

381

process is (estatei , “error”, ∅)). If no error is detected, S1 checks the remain-

382

ing two outputs. If all checks pass, S1 outputs Ypi =∅, Yui =∅, repi =0 (i.e., the

383

output for ideal process is (estatei , ypi , yui )); otherwise, S1 selects a random el-

384

ement r and outputs Ypi =r, Yui =∅, repi =1 (i.e., the output for ideal process

385

is (estatei , r, ∅)). In either case, S1 saves the appropriate states.

386

The input distributions to (U10 , U20 ) in the real and ideal experiments are com-

387

putationally indistinguishable. In the ideal experiment, the inputs are chosen

388

uniformly at random. In the real experiment, each part of all queries that

389

T makes to any one program in the step (4) of Pair is independently re-

390

randomized and the re-randomization factors are also truly randomly gener-

391

ated by using naive table-lookup method 4 . We consider the following three

392

possible cases:

393

Firstly, if (U10 , U20 ) behave honest in the round i, then EVIEWireal ∼ EVIEWiideal

394

(this is because T (U1 ,U2 ) perfectly executes Pair in the real experiment and

0

4

0

We argue that if v1 , v2 , V1 , and V2 are random elements in Z∗q , Z∗q , G1 , and

G2 , respectively, then the output of Rand is also a random, independent six-tuple
(V1 , V2 , v1 V1 , v2 V1 , v2 V2 , e(v1 V1 , v2 V2 )).
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395

S1 simulates with the same outputs in the ideal experiment, i.e., repi =0).

396

Secondly, if one of (U10 , U20 ) is dishonest in the round i and it has been detected

397

by both T and S1 (with probability 21 ), then it will result in an output of

398

“error”. Finally, we consider the case that the output of Pair is corrupted,

399

i.e., one of (U10 , U20 ) is dishonest in the round i while it is undetected (with

400

probability 21 ) by T . In the real experiment, the four outputs generated by

401

(U10 , U20 ) are multiplied together along with a random value λ−1 (see the step

402

(5) of our algorithm Pair). Thus, the output of Pair looks random to the

403

environment E. In the ideal experiment, S1 also simulates with a random

404

value r ∈ GT as the output. Thus, EVIEWireal ∼ EVIEWiideal even when one

405

of (U10 , U20 ) is dishonest. By the hybrid argument, we conclude that EVIEWreal

406

∼ EVIEWideal .

407

Secondly, we prove Pair Two UVIEWreal ∼ UVIEWideal :

408

The simulator S2 always behaves as follows: On receiving the input on round

409

i, S2 ignores it and instead makes four random queries of the form (Pj , Qj ) to

410

both U10 and U20 . Then S2 saves its states and the states of (U10 , U20 ). E can easily

411

distinguish between these real and ideal experiments (note that the output in

412

the ideal experiment is never corrupted). However, E cannot communicate this

413

information to (U10 , U20 ). This is because in the round i of the real experiment, T

414

always re-randomizes its inputs to (U10 , U20 ). In the ideal experiment, S2 always

415

generates random, independent queries for (U10 , U20 ). Thus, for each round i we

416

have UVIEWireal ∼ UVIEWiideal . By the hybrid argument, we conclude that

417

UVIEWreal ∼ UVIEWideal .

418

Theorem 2 In the one-malicious model, the algorithms (T, (U1 , U2 )) are an

419

(O( n1 ), 12 )-outsource-secure implementation of Pair, where n is the bit length
20

420

of the order q of bilinear groups.

421

Proof. The proposed algorithm Pair makes 3 calls to Rand plus 5 point

422

addition in G1 (or G2 ), and 4 multiplication in GT in order to compute e(A, B).

423

Also, the computation for Rand is negligible when using the table-lookup

424

method. On the other hand, it takes roughly O(n) multiplications in resulting

425

finite filed to compute the bilinear pairing 5 . Thus, the algorithms (T, (U1 , U2 ))

426

are an O( n1 )-efficient implementation of Pair.

427

On the other hand, U1 (resp. U2 ) cannot distinguish the two test queries from

428

the two real queries that T makes. If U1 (resp. U2 ) fails during any execution

429

of Pair, it will be detected with probability 12 .

430

4.4

431

We compare the proposed algorithm with the algorithm in [20]. We denote

432

by PA a point addition in G1 (or G2 ), by SM a point multiplication in G1

433

(or G2 ), by M a multiplication in GT , by Inv an inverse in GT , by Exp an

434

exponentiation in GT , and P a computation of the bilinear pairing. We omit
5

Comparison

The computation of bilinear pairings is closely related to the security parameters

(that determines the security levels), the kinds of curves (supersingular curves,
ordinary curves, or hyperelliptic curves), the kinds of bilinear pairings (the Weil
pairing, the Tate pairing, or the Eta pairing), the finite field (the characteristic
is 2, 3 or p) and embedding degree etc. Koblitz and Menezes [36] presented some
examples of the pairings evaluation under the various parameters. For example, it
takes roughly 22n multiplications in finite filed GF(p) to compute the Tate pairing
e(A, B) when E is a supersingular elliptic curve defined over GF(p) with embedding
degree k = 2, where p is a 512-bit prime in order to achieve 80-bit security level.
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435

other operations such as modular additions in Zq .

Table 1. Comparison of the two algorithms
Algorithm [20]

Algorithm Pair

T

10 Exp + 2 Inv + 6 SM + 4 PA + 6 M

5 PA + 4 M

U

4 P (U )

4 P (U1 ) + 4 P (U2 )

436

Table 1 presents the comparison of the efficiency between algorithm [20] and

437

our proposed algorithm Pair. Compared with the algorithm [20], the proposed

438

algorithm Pair is much superior in efficiency. More precisely, the outsourcer

439

T does not require the prohibitively expensive operations SM and Exp in our

440

algorithm Pair (note that a computationally limited device may be incapable

441

to perform such operations at all). Moreover, the computation of SM (or Exp)

442

is comparable to that of a pairing in some cases, and this will violate the

443

motivation of the outsourcing computations.

444

On the other hand, it takes the servers U to perform 8P in our algorithm

445

Pair (4P for each server Ui ). Besides, the computation for Rand is about

446

3P + 3Exp + 9SM, while it is negligible due to the table-lookup method.

447

Therefore, the proposed algorithm Pair requires more computation load in

448

the server side compared with [20]. However, note that the server is much

449

more computationally powerful, and thus the efficiency of our algorithm will

450

not be affected in this sense.
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451

5

Secure Outsourcing Algorithms for Identity-based Encryptions
and Signatures

452

453

In this section, we utilize the proposed subroutine Pair to give two secure

454

outsourcing algorithms for Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption scheme

455

[11] and Cha-Cheon identity-based signature scheme [18], where a special case

456

of bilinear pairing e : G1 × G1 → GT is used (i.e., G1 = G2 ).

457

Note that the outsourcer T is assumed to be a computationally limited de-

458

vice that cannot carry out the prohibitively expensive computations such as

459

bilinear pairings, point multiplications, modular exponentiations, and so on,

460

thus the proposed two algorithms requires an additional subroutine SM [19]

461

for outsourcing the computations of point multiplications in G1 .

462

5.1

463

The proposed outsource-secure Boneh-Franklin encryption scheme consists of

464

the following efficient algorithms:

Outsource-secure Boneh-Franklin Identity-based Encryptions

• Setup: Chooses a random s ∈ Z∗q and sets Ppub = sP . Define four cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1 , H2 : GT → {0, 1}n for some
n, H3 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → Z∗q and H4 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n . The public
parameters of the system are
params = {G1 , GT , e, q, P, Ppub , H1 , H2 , H3 , H4 }.
465

466

467

The master key is s.
• Extract: On input an identity ID, run the extract algorithm to obtain the
secret key SID = sH1 (ID).
23

468

• Encryption: On input the public key ID and a message m ∈ {0, 1}n , the

469

outsourcer T runs the subroutine Pair and SM to generate the ciphertext

470

C as follows:

471

(1) T chooses a random σ ∈ {0, 1}n and computes r = H3 (σ, m).

472

(2) T runs SM to obtain C1 = rP and R = rH1 (ID).

473

(3) T runs Pair to obtain Pair(R, Ppub ) → ϕ.

474

(4) T computes C2 = σ ⊕ H2 (ϕ) and C3 = m ⊕ H4 (σ).

475

(5) T outputs the ciphertext C = (C1 , C2 , C3 ).

476

• Decryption: On input the secret key SID , and the ciphertext C = (C1 , C2 , C3 ),

477

the outsourcer T 0 runs the subroutine Pair and SM to compute the message

478

m as follows:

479

(1) T 0 runs Pair to obtain Pair(SID , C1 ) → ϕ.

480

(2) T 0 computes σ = C2 ⊕ H2 (ϕ).

481

(3) T 0 computes m = C3 ⊕ H4 (σ).

482

(4) T 0 computes r = H3 (σ, m) and then runs SM to obtain rP .

483

(5) T 0 outputs m if and only if C1 = rP .

484

Remark 3. Note that the outsourcer only needs to perform 6 hash and 4

485

bitwise operations (instead of 2 pairings and 3 point multiplications) in the

486

above encryption scheme.

487

5.2

488

The proposed outsource-secure Cha-Cheon signature scheme consists of the

489

following efficient algorithms:

Outsource-secure Cha-Cheon Identity-based Signatures
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490

• Setup: Chooses a random s ∈ Z∗q and sets Ppub = sP . Define two crypto-

491

graphic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ × G1 → Zq , H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 . The pub-

492

lic parameters of the system are params = {G1 , GT , e, q, P, Ppub , H1 , H2 }.

493

The master key is s.

494

• Extract: On input an identity ID, run the extract algorithm to obtain the
signing key SID = sH2 (ID).

495

496

• Sign: On input the singing key SID and a message m, the outsourcer T
runs the subroutine SM to generate the signature σ as follows:

497

498

(1) T chooses a random r ∈ Z∗q and runs SM to obtain U = rH2 (ID).

499

(2) T computes h = H1 (m, U ).

500

(3) T runs SM to obtain V = (r + h)SID . The signature is σ = (U, V ).

501

• Verify: On input the verification key ID, the message m, and the signature

502

σ = (U, V ), the outsourcer T 0 runs the subroutine Pair and SM to verify

503

the signature σ as follows:

504

(1) T 0 computes h = H1 (m, U ).

505

(2) T 0 runs SM to obtain hH2 (ID) and computes T = U + hH2 (ID).

506

(3) T 0 runs Pair to obtain Pair(P, V ) → β1 and Pair(Ppub , T ) → β2 .

507

(4) T 0 outputs 1 if and only if β1 = β2 .

508

Remark 4. Note that the outsourcer only needs to perform 2 hash and 1

509

point addition operations (instead of 2 pairings and 3 point multiplications)

510

in the above signature scheme.

511

6

512

In this paper, we first proposed an efficient and secure outsourcing algorithm

513

for bilinear pairings in the two untrusted program model. A distinguishing

Conclusions
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514

property of our proposed algorithm is that the (resources-limited) outsourcer

515

never requires to accomplish some expensive operations such as point multi-

516

plications and exponentiations.

517

The security model of our outsourcing algorithm requires the outsourcer to

518

interact with two untrusted while non-colluding cloud servers (the same as

519

[32]). Therefore, an interesting open problem is whether there is an efficient

520

algorithm for securely outsourcing bilinear pairings using only one untrusted

521

cloud server.
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[10] Beuchat J., González-Díaz J.E., Mitsunari S., Okamoto E., Rodríguez-
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